The European Commission's 2015 
Introduction
Policy evaluation is not new in European Union (EU) policymaking. The EU has long had a legal requirement for ex post evaluation in relation to expenditure policies, and some regulatory instruments include clauses for ex post review, monitoring or evaluation. Yet the practice of evaluation has often been ad hoc and diverse across policy areas and Commission Directorates-General (DGs), whilst efforts for a more coherent approach have primarily focused on financial accountability. Ex post evaluation has mainly been of a technical nature, attracting little political attention. However, over the last 15 years, the European Commission has gradually built up its efforts in relation to ex post evaluation; and with the presentation of 2 the Commission's Better Regulation package 1 in May 2015, ex post evaluation has become a key issue on the political agenda. This article analyses this development as a gradual politicization of ex post evaluation in European governance.
It is important to first clarify the concepts of (policy) evaluation and politicization used in this article. The European Commission describes evaluation in its 2015 Better
Regulation Guidelines as "a tool to help the Commission assess the actual performance of EU interventions compared to initial activities", 2 and defines it as an evidence-based judgment of the extent to which an intervention has: In the Commission's use of the concept, 'evaluation' normally refers to ex post (i.e., retrospective) evaluation, which can be interim (i.e., at the midterm of an initiative), final (at its conclusion) or ex post in the strict sense (which can take place several years after the intervention has finished). The Commission talks about ex ante evaluation only in relation to expenditure programmes. The ex ante appraisal of new EU (regulatory) initiatives that take place via Integrated Impact Assessments is usually not referred to as 'evaluation'. Although linguistically there are no particular reasons to reserve the concept of evaluation to ex post and not ex ante appraisal, I will follow the Commission's predominant use of terminology here by using 'evaluation' or 'policy evaluation' as a shorthand for ex post evaluation, unless 1 I use the expression 'Better Regulation Package' for three documents adopted together in May 2015 which set out the European Commission's new Better Regulation approach and tools; Communication from the Commission, 'Better Regulation for Better Results -An EU Agenda ', 19 May 2015 , COM(2015 215 final (which sets out the general philosophy of the new BR approach); European Commission, 'Better Regulation
Guidelines ', 19 May 2015 , SWD(2015 111 final (which sets out the compulsory aspects of the BR strategy)
(further referred to as BR Guidelines 2015); and the 'Better Regulation Toolbox', attached to these Guidelines, which set out complementary guidance to assist practitioners in the application of the Guidelines (further referred to as BR Toolbox 2015).
3 explicitly indicated otherwise, such as in the case of 'evaluation throughout the policy cycle', which implies both ex ante and ex post evaluation.
It is equally useful at this stage to clarify what I understand to be politicization. The narrower, and institutionally focused, use of the concept of politicization is found in the political science and public administration literature that deals with the relationship between the assumed 'neutral' character of the bureaucracy and the political imperatives of elected politicians. 3 The more the bureaucracy is steered by political imperatives, the more the administration is politicized. Political control over the administration is desirable, as administrators lack the political elected mandate of politicians. At the same time, strong politicization of the administration may undermine the expertise of the administration and make policy excessively dependent on short-term political interests. Such politicization is particularly problematic when one is dealing with institutions that should profit from a considerable independence, such as courts or independent central banks.
A broader use of the concept of politicization relates less to institutions and more to the political salience of societal issues. When an issue is politicized, it becomes part of political debate and discussion. More precisely, it will be discussed within the political realm, which includes political (elected) representatives, party politics, interest groups and, most broadly, public debate. Politicization is then measured in terms of both salience (when does an issue rise higher on the political agenda?) and contestation (how polarized are positions about it?). 4 However, as a debate becomes more polarized, interest-based arguments are more likely to take the lead over evidence-based argumentation or search for the truth. The concept of politicization therefore often has a negative connotation. Most narrowly, a politicized debate would be characterized by motives of party politics, or simply politicians' interest in re-election, at the cost of expertise judgement. Hence, when one talks about the politicization of migration policy, or of crime, it most often comes with warning bells that the debate is not properly informed. 5 The tension between sound evidence and political motives and 4 argumentation has particularly been discussed in science and technology studies, where analysis of the scientification of politics has gone hand in hand with findings about the politicization of science.
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However, it should be said that politicization is not inherently bad. At its most basic level, it means that a topic is brought in the public realm of politics, which should ensure decision-making considering the common good. This positive role of politicization comes best to the forefront when politicization is pitched against its opposite, namely 'technocratization'. The latter also often has a negative connotation when it is used to refer to situations in which decision-making that should be made in the public realm is unduly kept in the hands of experts and administrators. 7 At the same time, the shielding of expert advice, or even decision-making, from political influences has often been heralded in modern governance, as it would ensure that policymaking is based on the best available evidence, independent of sectoral interests and short-term thinking that drives politicians. 8 Neither politicization nor technocratization is thus inherently bad. The question is about the right balance between the two. I therefore use politicization in this article as a 'neutral' concept, not implying a normative judgement, but simply referring to a process in which the topic of evaluation becomes increasingly part of a debate and agenda that is set, influenced by and played out in the political realm and not simply by experts and administrators. At the same time, I assess advantages and pitfalls of such politicization.
In Section B, I first briefly describe how policy evaluation in the EU developed from a focus on financial accountability that was mainly technical in nature, to a key principle of Better Regulation, identifying the key features of evaluation in the Commission's approach in recent years, and as part of the Better Regulation package in particular. The following sections will analyse the increasing politicization of evaluation that results from this London, Longman, 1999, pp. 11-28. 5 development. Section C analyses how evaluation becomes more politicized as it becomes a key element of the Better Regulation strategy, which the Juncker Commission has propelled to a key political priority. Section D analyses the politicization that is inherent when evaluation becomes a general principle of Better Regulation, applied to both redistributive and regulatory policies and throughout the policy cycle. Section E studies the politicization that results from the increased participatory nature of EU policy evaluation. I finally conclude with some reflections on the challenges of a more politicized evaluation strategy, particularly at a time when populism delegitimizes many modern governance mechanisms.
B From Financial Accountability to a General Principle of Better Regulation
The EU has engaged in project and programme evaluation for several decades now. However, evaluation has been especially focused on expenditure policies, such as structural funds, research and development, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and development aid.
Although initial evaluation practices developed ad hoc within different DGs, the increase in the EU budget and EU expenditure during the 1990s, as well as instances of corruption and the legitimacy crisis related to the resignation of the Santer Commission, led to a more systematic approach to evaluation in the European Commission. Legal requirements and control were tightened to ensure financial accountability.
Evaluation became centrally enshrined in budgetary allocations and the 7-year financial programming cycle. Evaluation standards were developed by DG Budget in 1999 (and revised in 2004) to guide DGs in their evaluation work, particularly when outsourcing evaluation to external consultants. 9 All DGs were supposed to develop their evaluation capacity, particularly through the establishment of evaluation units. However, many DGs (especially those not involved in expenditure policy) considered evaluation a formality they had to comply with, rather than a useful exercise they could learn from.
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More recently, the European Commission has aimed for a reorientation of its evaluation policy. Having established these key features of the Commission's new evaluation approach, the following sections more closely analyse how this affects the politicization of evaluation. As the new evaluation guidelines are now included in the Better Regulation
C Policy Evaluation as a Political Priority, Steered from the Top

I Political Priority
Guidelines drafted by the Secretariat General, they become more stringent in nature, compared to the 'practical solutions and good practices' previously suggested by DG Budget.
As the document states, "the main guidelines set out the mandatory requirements and obligations for each step in the policy cycle whilst the Toolbox provides additional guidance and advice which is not binding unless expressly stated to be so" (emphasis added).
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The centralization of evaluation within the Commission should be seen in the context of two other processes. Firstly, the Commission's management in general has become more centralized over the last decade in an attempt to make the Commission both more presidential and political in nature. The Commission President is no longer a primus inter pares among the other Commissioners, but increasingly a primus super pares, with increasing powers over the appointment, organization and dismissal of other commissioners, and the ability to set agendas and define the alternatives at stake. 21 The Secretariat General has been strengthened to support him in that role, 22 so that the President has increased control not only over the lightening the regulatory load while keeping high levels of social, health and environmental protection and consumer choice. We will overhaul the rules to make sure they contribute to the jobs and growth agenda and do not impose unnecessary red tape or administrative burdens, while at the same time bringing the benefits that citizens expect. Where the rules are outdated or out of line with our priorities, we will review and improve them. Where there is unnecessary red tape, we will cut it. Where the rules we have make sense and serve our objectives, we will work actively to ensure they are properly applied, implemented and enforced so they deliver real benefits to citizens. And we will use the other tools we have available to drive jobs and growth, in particular the EU budget which is primarily a means for smart investment in Member States and regions". (emphasis added) 25 The result is a Commission that wants to be big on big things, and small on small things. It would be difficult to counter-argue the Commission's statement that "Citizens expect the EU to make a difference on the big economic and social challenges -high unemployment, slow growth, high levels of public debt, an investment gap and lack of competitiveness in the global marketplace". 26 Rising Euroscepticism is surely linked to the failure of the EU to address big social challenges. 27 The Juncker Commission's starting point is a promise to focus on these big challenges. At the same time, its focus on the regulatory burden and interpretation of the EP elections as being citizens wanting less EU interference is more open to questioning. Can the EP elections of 2014 really be interpreted as a primary question to reduce red tape for business, rather than dissatisfaction with the way the EU had dealt with the financial crisis and failure to address socio-economic problems appropriately?
That the Commission sees itself increasingly as a political Commission mandated by the EP elections and that the 2014 elections implied answering the concern of regulatory burden is nicely illustrated by the following quote from the European Commission' 14 RSB has so far not attached positive or negative judgements to individual evaluations, although it intends to do so from 2017 onwards. 34 However, even then, there will not be a procedural 'sanctioning mechanism' when an evaluation is judged negatively, unlike for impact assessments, which are sent back to the DG for redrafting if judged negatively by the RSB. Therefore, RSB opinions on evaluations are supposed to create learning in the longer term and do not ensure sanctioned quality control on individual evaluations. Of the seven assessments of evaluations in 2016, for instance, the RSB concluded that there were generally shortcomings regarding critical analysis of coherence, relevance and added value, and there were no systematic conclusions for follow-up action, whilst the analysis of effectiveness and efficiency was more complete in evaluation reports. 35 The scrutiny of evaluation is thus not as tight as that of impact assessments, but there is clearly an intention to streamline evaluation practices across DGs in function of priorities and procedures set out centrally.
D Evaluation as a General Principle throughout the Policy Cycle
I Linking ex ante and ex post
When evaluation becomes a general principle throughout the policy cycle for all types of policy intervention, it will inevitably be more political in nature than when it is simply an ex post tool of financial accountability limited to expenditure programmes. 15 inefficient use of resources that largely function through deterrent and permanent technical control rather than high levels of politicization. The political accountability of this process only comes into play when the evaluation report would be used in the EP to highlight waste of taxpayers' money and bad implementation or to more politically contest the added value of the intervention.
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Similarly, learning in evaluation can remain technocratic. When evaluation is focused on projects and programmes, learning is often limited to the officers dealing with it.
Experience from evaluation may feed into the next cycle of a programme, but even then this is not straightforward as policy officers dealing with evaluation of the past project/programme may be different than those drafting the new one.
By making evaluation a general principle throughout the policy cycle, accountability and learning become more political in nature throughout the entire process. The 'evaluation first' principle links ex post evaluation inevitably to judgement calls that are more political in nature. Past initiatives are assessed in function of the ability to make judgements on the orientation and re-orientation of future action. Evaluation is not simply done to confirm that the rules have been respected or that the original objectives have been reached, but also to feed in more political judgement calls on what the future objectives should be. This is strengthened by the fact that the Commission's new evaluation strategy aims explicitly at learning and accountability that goes beyond the individual project or programme. Of particular importance in this regard are 'fitness checks', which were introduced in 2010.
Fitness checks aim at a comprehensive evaluation of a policy area (i.e. the evaluation of a group of related interventions that are linked by a common set of objectives) rather than of single programmes or acts. Fitness checks help to give higher political leverage to evaluation, as they extend beyond the tiny network of a single regulatory intervention. At the same time, they are particularly embedded in the political priority of the REFIT programme to reduce the regulatory burden.
II Expenditure and Regulatory Policy
One can argue that it is not only the intrinsic link between ex ante and ex post evaluation that strengthens the politicized nature of the process but also that evaluation is now generally extended to regulatory intervention and not just expenditure policy. Measuring the costs and benefits of existing regulatory policy is bound to open more questions about how this can be quantified than in the case of expenditure policy. Therefore, evaluation of regulatory action is bound to raise more political debate on the value and method of quantification and how methodology relates to the set objectives. Put differently, in the case of expenditure, there is more likely to be a clearer divide between an ex post evaluation based on a recognized established method, which might then fit (or not fit) into a separate debate on new redistributive intervention; whilst in the case of regulatory intervention, there is more likely a blurring of the debates on the correct target setting and their measurement in both ex post and ex ante evaluation.
III The Interinstitutional Dimension
In addition to the intrinsic link between ex ante and ex post evaluation, and the application of evaluation to both expenditure and regulatory policy, there is a third way in which evaluation becomes more politicized when applied as a general principle throughout the policy cycle.
With the 2015 Better Regulation package, the Commission increasingly stresses that Better
Regulation is not only the Commission's responsibility. Better Regulation that appears to be of a rather technical nature. However, the increasing focus on the interinstitutional dimension of Better Regulation also creates a context in which the institutions are expected to scrutinize each other's evidence base more actively, which also allows blame-shifting and contestation. Providing evidence, ex ante and ex post, is a duty for all, making the evidence-gathering process potentially more politicized, as it can become more openly the object of (interinstitutional) contestation.
IV Evaluation as a 'Neutral' General Principle of Better Regulation or Subordinated to Pre-Established Political Agenda?
The Commission presents evaluation (and evidence-based policymaking more broadly) as a general principle of Better Regulation. This appears to give it the aura of a neutral procedural principle. However, there is a strong tension here in the Commission's approach. On the one hand, it aims to 'depoliticize' evaluation and present it as a neutral exercise of assessment that provides the evidence basis for political deliberation that would only follow subsequently. On the other hand, it has strongly linked evaluation to the political priority of reducing the regulatory burden. Whilst the Commission is proud to flag this as a political priority (and thus politicizes evaluation), it wants to avoid discussion on the value of such a political choice (thus avoiding politicization). The objectives of the evaluation system appear beyond discussion, whilst individual evaluations are said to be neutral as they should simply assess against the originally set objectives of a regulatory act, programme or project without debating such objectives. However, evaluation always implies choices about priorities, what to evaluate and how to do it. As I will analyse in the following section, whilst the
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Commission is keen to encourage participation to receive information on inefficiencies of existing policy, it is much less keen for the priorities and implicit choices of evaluation to be debated more broadly.
E Politicization through Participation
I Consultation
In the words of the European Commission, "Better Regulation is not a bureaucratic exercise.
Citizens, businesses and other stakeholders judge the EU on the impacts of its actions: not just new initiatives, but, even more importantly, the rules already in force" (emphasis added). 19 did stakeholders have a more prominent role by providing feedback on various aspects of the study. 46 Participation has long been perceived as something that came mainly after the evaluation had been made. By "publishing evaluation findings, the Commission is publicly taking responsibility for its actions, acknowledging how an intervention is performing and inviting further feedback". 47 The invitation for further feedback suggests a participatory approach to evaluation, but only after evaluation reports have been adopted. However, consultation on the Roadmap is the start, not the end of the participatory process. The Guidelines state that it is essential to consult on all the mandatory evaluation criteria, which are effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value. 52 This assumes that the consultation process extends to the evaluation exercise itself and not simply to the Roadmap setting out its general features. As is the case in ex ante policy drafting, the responsible DG (and the ISG in particular) has some flexibility on how to organize its consultation strategy in the evaluation process.
However, it has to comply with the following:
1) The General Principles of Consultation: consult as widely as possible, make the consultation process and how it has affected policymaking transparent, consult at a time where stakeholder views can still make a difference and ensure consistency of consultation processes across services. 
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3) The consultation process needs to include a 12 week internet based public online consultation at some point over the lifetime of the evaluation (which, corresponding the minimum standards set out above, needs to be announced on the 'Your Voice in Europe' website), unless the Secretariat General allows a derogation. This new participatory approach to evaluation raises many challenges, some of a mere practical and others of a more substantive nature. I will start with the latter.
Firstly, the new participatory approach politicizes evaluation in a very different way than was thus far the focus. Until now, interest politics and politicization were supposed to happen mainly once an evaluation report was produced. Evaluation was a rather independent exercise, to be done either by the Commission, or, in most cases, by an independent contractor. Such an 'independent report' would provide the evidence to ensure accountability, which could be ensured by parliamentary control and public debate. Hence, politicization happens ex post to evaluation and mainly to ensure accountability. By ensuring participation throughout the entire evaluation exercise, interest politics and politicization become a stronger feature of the entire process.
Secondly, this raises practical questions, particularly as evaluation is traditionally outsourced to private consultancies. These consultancies lack the extensive experience the Commission has built up in relation to consultation practices for policy drafting and ex ante assessment. Can they quickly adjust to 'copy' these practices? Although the latter suggests that comments may also propose amendment and re-regulation, the focus seems very much on whether the existing regulatory framework is too 'irritating' or 'burdensome'. engagement on substance by the Commission, although it was not considered appropriate for further Platform discussion. However, overall, after 20 months since the website's creation, the amount of valuable information that has reached the REFIT Platform via this path appears minimal. As the key participatory tool to receive feedback on how EU policy is implemented, and particularly on how it creates regulatory burden, the website does not yet appear to live up to its expectations.
III Politicization through the Mobilization of Civil Society on Issues of Better Regulation
The rise of Better Regulation as an issue on the political agenda has not gone unnoticed by increasing understanding among civil society, media and decision makers about the risks and potential negative impacts of the Better Regulation agenda on social, environmental, labour, consumer and public health standards for citizens and the public interest; and challenging the widely held belief that regulation is a burden for society.
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Better Regulation, and evaluation, is thus no longer the realm of a small group of technocrats, but its wider orientation and societal impact are discussed by civil society 67 The Corporate Europe Observatory was originally set up in 1997. 68 Better Regulation Watchdog, 'Who are We', available at: <www.betterregwatch.eu/about-us/>. 27 organizations, some of which have been set up with the specific objective of focusing on (a part of) the Better Regulation strategy. encouraged to contribute to evaluation, they are not supposed to discuss or put into question the objectives of the evaluation process itself. Participation has to function within the political parameters already set by the Commission. From that perspective, the Commission presents evaluation as a neutral procedural exercise and it fears politicization that would contest the underlying political orientation of the pretended neutral exercise. However, some civil society organizations have mobilized to do that exactly, that is politicize the debate on evaluation by pointing out that appraisal is not a neutral exercise.
We are at a crucial moment in time where populism risks undermining the basic principles of liberal democracy and the pillars on which modern governance is built.
Evaluation can both fall victim to and be a vanguard against such populism. On the one hand, one has to be cautious that evaluation may end up being a tool to appease populist discourse.
The EU tendency to use evaluation strongly in function of reducing the regulatory burden is a risky strategy in this regard. Populist movements all over Europe have taken EU regulatory action as one of their primary targets to justify retreat from and demise of the EU, in order to 'take back control' and defend nationalist, protectionist and exclusionary policies. These movements all describe the European regulatory framework as a useless set of rules, simply there to satisfy the interests of a self-serving bureaucracy and corrupt elite. By increasingly stressing the 'regulatory burden' of EU policy, the EU risks simply strengthening a populist
